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Abstract 
Standards consortia are private industry alliances that serve a certain purpose and gather 
likeminded companies that share the same interest to sponsor and develop technologies for 
standardization. Compared to formal standard setting, participation in consortia is less 
bureaucratic, more efficient in reacting to market needs and allows, in respect to the tiered 
membership structures, a strategic influence of standard setting outcomes. Formal 
standardization is in contrast an often protracted process of development and negotiation. 
This paper tries to provide a broad and comprehensive picture of standards consortia and 
their dynamic development in the past ten years. Analyses show that consortia have distinct 
characteristics which help to explain and justify their presence in the standard setting context.  
The observation of consortia existence over time identifies relationships between the 
formation, termination and merger of consortia with respect to market and technology 
development. Furthermore the paper seeks to measure consortia performance with respect to 
organizational structures and market position. Therefore we test the likelihood of consortia 
termination. Results of a survival analysis reveal that the probability of consortia success is 
especially connected to structures that determine coordination among members. Additionally 
the scope and focus on technology and markets also influences if consortia remain in business 
over time. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past years the complexity and speed of technological development has constantly been 
increasing. Especially in the field of information and communication technologies (ICT), 
markets show evidence of a higher variety of products and solutions in a more frequent 
manner (David, 1996). The need for technological standardization is growing (Blind et al., 
2010), but the complexity and speed challenge companies in their coordination activities. 
Standard setting is a complex process, which is dependent on consensus agreements between 
often competing organizations. These processes can take several years. Especially formal 
standard bodies are sometimes not able to keep up with the market pace (Cargill, 2002). Since 
fast changing markets required more flexible solutions to set standards, the standardization 
landscape has changed over the past twenty years (Updegrove, 2008). Today not only formal 
standard developing organizations (SDOs), but also informal industry driven standard setting 
organizations such as consortia, produce widely adopted and important standard solutions. 
Other than formal organizations, which produce so called “de jure standards”, informal 
consortia create and promote mostly “de facto standards” (Jakobs, 2004). For the latter we can 
further distinguish between a “de facto standard” developed by a single firm and a “consortia 
standard”, where the standard is set by a group of firms (Bunduchi et al., 2008).  
 Formal standardization is often time consuming and can take several years, whereas 
informal consortia are more flexible and able to anticipate technological development and 
thus set the standard right in time (Cargill, 2002). Even though informal standard 
specifications are agreed on without a formal accreditation, they can still be widely accepted 
and of great importance or even follow up a certain formal standard (Blind et al., 2010). Yet, 
there is no common definition for a standards consortia and the consortia landscape has 
developed to be very heterogeneous in characteristics such as technical issues, structure, 
members, transparency or IP policies (Hawkins, 1999). Updegrove (2008) defines consortia 
as being “anything from a loose, unincorporated affiliation of companies, to an incorporated 
entity with offices, marketing, technical and administrative staff and a multi-million dollar 
budget”. He distinguishes between specification groups which agree to promote an industry 
standard, research consortia with the main intent of creating and developing a technologic 
solution and strategic consortia which focus on the adoption of a technology or the 
formulization of a yet informal common practice (Updegrove, 1995).  
 In this article we consider standards consortia which meet the criteria set by the ISSS 
CEN Survey: 
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- The organization must be international in outlook and scope, not simply an instrument 
of single-nation policy,  
- must have an active and international membership, 
- must not be set-up specifically as a single vendor, government, or proprietary 
technology advocacy group, 
- must be of importance to the areas of standardization or its processes (CEN/ISSS, 
2009).  
In Europe (Council of the European Union, 2000) and in the US (Center for Regulatory 
Effectiveness, 2000) standards consortia are recognized as being organizations that influence 
standard setting processes, but which are not officially recognized (Egyedi, 2001). So far 
there has not been much empirical work on the role of consortia. Earlier work mostly focuses 
on theoretical explanations for the existence of consortia (Cargill, Weiss 1992: Updegrove 
1995; Axelrod et al., 1995; Hawkins, 1999; Bunduchi et al., 2008). More current research 
uses a case study approach and characterizes and compares the processes of informal 
consortia such as Updegrove (1995): X Consortium and Open GIS Consortia, Egyedi (2001): 
W3C and ECMA, Coulon (2004): Symbian Alliance, Anderson (2008): ECMA, IETF, OASIS, 
OMG and W3C, Koenig (2008): FlexRay, Autosar and Jaspar, Grotnes (2009): Open Mobile 
Alliance (OMA). A first comprehensive analysis on the evolution of standards consortia was 
done by Blind & Gauch (2008). They accessed a dataset of more than 250 consortia to map 
the change of consortia between 2000 & 2004 and found evidence for a complimentary 
relationship of formal and informal standard setting activities. Other empirical contributions 
rather focus on the effects of consortia in terms of coordination outcomes and efficiency 
(Leiponen, 2008; Delcamp and Leiponen; 2012; Baron et. al., 2012). 
 This paper presents a unique dataset of over 400 standards consortia. Consortia are 
analyzed by characteristics, attributes, membership, active markets and industries as well as 
by the dynamics of consortia evolution over the last 10 years. The article uses 14 editions of 
the ISSS CEN survey on ICT standards consortia. Further information was added exploiting 
the consortia database of Andrew Updegrove (http://www.consortiuminfo.org/). To retrieve 
historical membership information on consortia activity as well as memberships, the paper 
further makes use of the internet archive waybackmachine (http://archive.org).  
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2. Theoretical Considerations 
In many literature sources, standards consortia are described as explicit alliances or groups, 
which are especially formed when the fast evolution of technology requires coordination 
mechanisms (Axelrod et al., 1995). Such alliances are further defined as groups of companies 
where the benefits of the collective activity arise from a commonly produced public good 
(Olson, 1971; Cargill and Weiß, 1992). Irrespective of the costs of producing the public good, 
the good is equally available to all members. However, members’ benefits and incentives to 
invest may differ (Kindleberger, 1983). Groups emerge when a single firm is incapable of 
producing a certain good itself.  Firms thus join groups when the collective activity is 
beneficial and exceeds the costs of membership. Incentives to join or leave the group are 
simply related to a cost-benefit analysis, though groups may scale costs to counteract 
defection (McGuire, 1972). The size of the group matters as a factor of effective coordination. 
As to Olson (1971), coordination failures such as “cheating” or “free-riding” diminish when 
the group is held respectively small. Furthermore, the costs of coordination increase with the 
size of the group. Groups are characterized as “exclusive” groups when the collective good 
increases by excluding others. In comparison “inclusive” groups are these, where it is more 
beneficial to include as many market participants as possible.  
 Group formation in standard setting postulates a special case of coordination and 
collective benefits. Standards are subject to network externalities since users of a standard 
obtain benefits not only from the technology itself but furthermore depend on the share of 
users in the market. Thus, the success of a standard always depends on the installed base of 
users (David and Greenstein 1990). When network externalities are significant, firms have to 
coordinate in product development processes. This coordination can be reached by standard-
writing committees such as standard consortia (Weiss, Sibru, 1990). Besen and Johnson 
(1986) list several conditions for successful coordination in standard setting. In this sense, the 
consortia should gather a certain market share of the industry, the group should not be subject 
to antitrust objections and members should reduce the number of technological alternatives to 
reach consensus while further eliminating subjective disputes.  
 In conclusion, standards consortia are subject to network externalities, while also 
inhibiting coordination failures of a group. Oslen (1971) argued that small groups benefit 
from coordination efficiencies. In comparison Axelrod (1995) states that consortia are 
especially successful when they gather most market players. The latter argument is further 
connected to the installed base of a standard, which increases with the number of participants 
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sponsoring the standard (David and Greenstein, (1990). To a certain extent standards 
consortia are inclusive, since a common standardization project is only reasonable when a 
sufficient number of market players participate. However, standards consortia pursue a 
particular approach to standardization compared to formal standard bodies. While formal 
standardization seeks consensus decisions and is open to all market participants, standards 
consortia are more closed in their membership rules. Membership fees, more regular meetings 
and a certain interest to influence technologies in early stages differentiate consortia from 
formal bodies. A consortium can thus be seen as an exclusive group of firms that are more 
committed to standardization or have a particular interest in a technology. However, consortia 
are inclusive to the limits of likeminded companies that share the same interests. 
3. Methodology 
This paper uses a broad approach to illustrate the dynamic landscape of ICT consortia over 
the past ten years. The research is based on the use of two data bases that have assembled 
more than 700 informal standards consortia since 1998. The CEN survey provides 
information on 435 informal ICT standardization consortia. These consortia have been 
selected based on transparent and objective selection criteria, which are stated above. The 
survey by Andrew Updegrove2 provides information on 555 consortia, 276 of which are not 
covered by the CEN survey. Both data sources indicate the tiering of membership, the 
consortium scope, technical categories, industry sectors, IP policies and years of existence. 
The number and identification of consortium members (including 20,000 independent entities 
in more than 35,000 consortium memberships), was retrieved by an internet search using data 
from historic homepages from the internet archive waybackmachine (http://archive.org).  To 
get a complete picture of the informal standard setting landscape, information from all 
databases were matched. However, to guarantee database compliance, time series analysis 
only uses information from fifteen editions of the ISSS CEN survey from 1998 until 2009. 
Furthermore, not all consortia could be classified in their respective attributes, since some 
consortia do not provide distinct information. Attributes such as industry sector, technical 
category, business spectrum and IP policy were only assessed from the CEN survey data. 
Finally, we build up a data panel over the time span of 1998-2009 to better assess 
organizational effects on consortia survival. We apply one year periods and use consortia 
termination as our event of failure.  
                                                          
2
 http://www.consortiuminfo.org/ 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Consortia Characteristics and Attributes  
In contrast to formal standard bodies where structures are fixed and default, the formation 
process of informal consortia allows a variety of organizational choices. The four charts in 
figure 1 give a vivid picture of informal ICT consortia characterized by member quantity, 
membership levels, business spectrum and industry sector. The two former attributes reveal 
information on specific member information such as quantity and member levels. The latter 
two charts illustrate the sector and the scope of involvement.    
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
   
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Characteristics and attributes of informal ICT standards consortia 
Membership Levels (n=267) Consortia Member Quantity (n= 278) 
Business Spectrum (n=227) Industry Category / Sector (n=146) 
16.3%
83.7%
Broad (16.3%)
Narrow (83.7%)
37.67%
17.12%
15.75%
8.22%
8.22% 6.85%
6.16%
Telecom (37.67%)
e-Commerce (17.12%)
Electronics (15.75%)
Advocacy (8.22%)
Multi-Industry (8.22%)
Life Science / Health (6.85%)
Manufactoring / Automotive 
(6.16%)
40.6%
37.1%
20.1%
2.2%
<50 (40.6%)
50-100 (37.1%)
100-300 (20.1%)
300 + (2.2%)
23.6%
3.7%
2.6%
69.3%
0.7%
Flat (23.6%)
Individual (3.7%)
Revenue Based (2.6%)
Tiered (69.3%)
Employee Based 
(0.7%)
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Most consortia have a considerably low amount of members, since 77.7% have less than 100 
participants, 20.1% have 100-300 members and only 2.2% list more than 300 members. To 
illustrate the scope of involvement in standard setting among consortia, the business spectrum 
was classified into broad and narrow. Only 16.3% of the consortia follow a broad spectrum of 
standardization, which is comparable to structures in formal standard bodies. The so called 
“one purpose consortia” usually pursue only one standard or specification and their business 
can therefore be classified as narrow (83.7%). These findings can be related to the quantity of 
memberships. The data shows that most narrow consortia tend to have a lower amount of 
members. A possible assumption is that this leads to more effective and flexible decision 
making processes within consortia. Both attributes are distinct characteristics to differentiate 
consortia from formal standard bodies, since the latter mostly follow a broad business 
spectrum and tend to have a higher number of members. The evaluation of the CEN survey 
further provides information on the primary and secondary industry sector where a particular 
consortium is active in. These findings indicate a very heterogeneous picture of the consortia 
landscape. In order to better frame these results, data was aggregated into seven categories. 
Over a third of the consortia produce standards for the telecommunication industry (37.67%). 
E-Commerce (17.2%) and electronics (15.75%) also make up one third of the consortia target 
industry. Less ICT related industries such as advocacy, life-science, manufacturing and multi-
industry summarize the last third of consortia target industries. These results are in line with 
most researchers’ assumptions that especially ICT industries rely on more flexible and quick 
standard solutions developed by informal consortia. 
 The chart of membership levels illustrates the hierarchical structures of consortia. A 
flat membership structure can only be found in 23.6% of the regarded consortia. The findings 
indicate that informal standard setting is in many cases strategically dominated by market 
power and revenue of commercial entities and vendors. Organization types and shares per 
member level can be consulted in figure 2. The graph shows that 93.56% of the members are 
vendors and other commercial entities, whereas universities and colleges account for only 
2.52%, governmental entities for 0.17% and consumer groups for a stake of 3.75%. 
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Figure 2 Consortia membership structure 
As to the results of the survey, 69.3% of the standards consortia have tiered membership 
structures, where the member levels can in general be differentiated into Leaders, Followers 
and Spectators.  
 
Figure 3 Consortia membership structure as to shares in tiered levels 
Using this classification by Updegrove (2008) data analyses indicate that the Leader level is 
dominated by commercial entities, most universities can be found in the Follower and Leader 
level and governmental entities and consumer groups mostly choose the Spectator level 
(figure 3). However, all member levels are strongly dominated by vendors. In most cases 
membership fees are scaled, since Leaders usually pay higher dues. Thus they have more 
voting or veto power and are able to strategically influence the standard setting process. In 
consequence membership levels often reflect the balance of member power (Updegrove, 
2008). 
 A very political and lately often discussed topic is the interplay of IPR and standards. 
In comparison to formal standard bodies, the IP policies of consortia are not always 
transparent and distinct. Thus only 95 consortia could be classified appropriately.  
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Figure 4 IP policy statements of consortia per technical class 
The survey differentiates between royalty free and FRAND (Fair Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory) IP policies. Standard setting organizations often mandatorily require firms 
participating in standard setting to disclose any patent that might turn out to be essential for 
the standard in question. Furthermore holders of such patents have to submit a declaration on 
whether they accept to commit on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms for licensing 
these patents (FRAND commitments). If a firm discloses a patent and refuses to commit on 
such licensing terms, the standard organization will usually set the standard excluding the 
protected technology. Even though standardization may be accompanied by complex 
licensing agreements, the rules for licensing of complementary patents essential for a common 
standard are often unclear and can be subject to complex discussions. Nevertheless, FRAND 
commitments are commonly seen as an important instrument to curb anticompetitive and 
abusive strategies. In situations of royalty free commitments firms may include patents into 
standards but commit upfront to not charge royalties (Layne-Farrar et al. 2007; Farrell et al. 
2007).  
 As to the CEN survey 54.7% of the consortia follow a FRAND policy, whereas 
43.3% of the consortia use royalty free IPR regulations. To better assess these results, 
consortia were also classified in their technical classes. Figure 4 illustrates the IP Rules of 
consortia per technology. The graph shows that IP policies differ between technologies and it 
thus seems presumable that the technical topic determines the pursued IPR rules. The high 
number of royalty free consortia in software is on the one hand due to several open source 
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consortia which can be found within this class and can on the other hand be explained by the 
fact that IPR on software is restricted in several countries. Explanations of other technological 
classes are not always obvious and have to be assessed on a lower level of aggregation, since 
IPR rules differ between specific products and companies involved. However, one has to 
consider that F/RAND policies may also allow to license essential patents royalty free.  
4.2 Consortia Development Phases 
There are several articles that describe the development of standardization with respect to the 
formation and evolution of informal consortia (Hawkins, 1999; Cargill 2002; Jakobs, 2003; 
Updegrove 2008). However, there is yet no comprehensive quantitative approach to examine 
the survival of standards consortia over time. Using the CEN survey editions between 1998 
and 2009 the data assembles a current list of ICT consortia for every year and even twice a 
year in 2001 and 2006. Figure 5 shows the quantity of consortia at the respective point of 
time, also indicating the fluctuation rate, which is the sum of new and terminating consortia. 
To consider consortia evolution with respect to the standardized technologies, figure 6 
illustrates the consortia development assigned to the respective technology class.  
 
 
Figure 5 Evolution of ICT standards consortia 1998-2009 
Since the mid-1990ies the increasing formation of consortia can be explained by the rise of 
the internet market, where the first peak of development is in June 2000, counting 123 new 
consortia compared to July 1999. This period is characterized by strong standard battles 
(Microsoft Explorer vs. Netscape Navigator) and the rise of future influential consortia in the 
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internet infrastructure such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) or the World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C) (Cargill, 2002; Updegrove, 2008). Figure 6 shows that the class 
Internet / Web Services increased from a share of 14.47% in July 1999 to 20.16% in May 
2001. 
 The next fluctuation peak can be found in 2002, where 107 consortia were 
terminated compared to May 2001. Taking a closer look at the technology class development, 
especially the percentage of Internet / Web Service consortia decreased from 20.44% in 
October 2002 to 16.67% in November 2003. Also Security and Wireless / Mobile decreased 
in their shares between 2-3%. A deeper look at the data also shows a consolidation process. 
Several consortia were not dissolved but merged with other consortia. The consortia amount 
remained stable in other technology classes and thus gained an increase of share.  
 Taking into account the burst of the “dot-com bubble” between 2000 and 2001 where 
the NASDAQ Composite had a historical decrease, these economic developments also led the 
consortia formation into a recession. The results are evidence for the close relation of market 
development and consortia formation. Thus the findings show how quickly consortia standard 
setting activities are able to react to economic developments and changing market needs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Consortia technology development 1998-2009 
A significant period of consortia formation started in 2005. Between October 2004 and July 
2005 the CEN Survey data identifies an amount of 133 new consortia. The technical class 
development shows that the share of software orientated consortia tripled within one year. 
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This development was especially due to a new awareness of open standards in general and the 
rise of the open source consortia in particular. One third of the software consortia can be 
distinctly identified as open source projects. Except for Internet / Web Services a new 
formation of consortia in all technical classes has taken place. This gives evidence for an 
increasing broader appreciation of standard setting consortia. 
 Since the highest peak level in 2006, counting a quantity of 304 consortia, the 
formation of new consortia remained on a constantly low level in the years to come. In 
contrast between September 2006 and 2007 the second highest peak of consortia termination 
took place, as 50 consortia ended their business or merged with others. Again these findings 
can be linked to economic events, as the US subprime mortgage crises took place in 2007, 
which later triggered the worldwide financial crises starting in 2008. The findings are able to 
reflect the close connection of consortia development and industry performance. The timing 
of consortia formation and termination again indicates that consortia formation is more 
flexible and dynamic and thus able to react immediately to ups and downs of market 
development. 
4.3 Consortia Performance 
In order to measure the performance of standards consortia we apply a survival analysis over 
the whole sample of our survey. The survival or termination of consortia may be subject to 
multiple occurrences. In our preceding section we have discussed consortia termination as a 
result of technology or market shocks. Consortia termination may consequently be the 
implication of technology obsolescence or economic recession. However, reasons for 
dissolving a consortium may also be connected to organizational structures or performance. 
 In some cases the purpose to form a consortium is to standardize a specific 
technology without the intention to continue development once the project is finalized. 
Consortia termination would thus be the consequence of previous decisions. Furthermore, 
consortia often operate similar to commercial corporations with permanent employees, a 
budget, income streams and customers. If business goals cannot be achieved anymore 
consortia may dissolve and go bankrupt. Since the purpose of standardization is always 
connected to coordination of firms, disputes and discrepancies may be another reason why a 
consortium is dissolved. We have discussed that consortia are special interest groups that 
pursue a common goal. If these interests and goals diverge, collective activities may be ended. 
 In the following we seek to measure which consortia structures would survive longer 
in technology and market conjunctures. We therefore calculate the Kaplan-Meier estimates of 
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the probability that a consortium terminates. Survival estimates are the likelihood that an 
observation will “survive” for a specific time. At each time in our analysis, only consortia that 
have been observed are taken into account. The following statistics are therefore not subject to 
truncation problems. Downward steps of the survival function represent failures. The y axis 
denotes the percentage of consortia that survive over time as to years on the x axis.  
  
Figure 7 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of consortia termination by consortia focus and IP 
policy 
Results from figure 7 represent the survival functions of consortia as to consortia focus and IP 
policy. The left graph shows that standards consortia which pursue a broad focus in their 
standards projects survive respectively longer compared to narrow purpose consortia. Results 
indicate that after 10 years almost 50% of narrow focused consortia are terminated. This 
finding may confirm the notion that consortia are in some cases formed to solve a very 
specific problem over a limited period of time. Survival of these so called “one purpose 
consortia” would thus be subject to planned termination. However one could also argue that 
consortia which are able to extend their business focus to additional standards projects are 
more successful and thus survive respectively longer. 
 In the right graph in figure 7, we estimate whether the differences of IP polices have 
an influence on consortia survival. To make results of the Kaplan-Meier survival test visible 
we changed the scale of our y axis. However, survival developments seem to show no 
significant differences between the two licensing schemes. Only in periods after seven years 
consortia with a royalty free policy seem to survive longer, while the survival rate decreases 
after ten years to the same level as FRAND policy consortia. These developments may 
furthermore be connected to the technology that is developed (figure 4). We argued earlier 
that FRAND commitments also include royalty free agreements. Yet analysis is far from 
conclusive to explain the effects of IP policies on the survival of consortia.  
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 Consortia size is a crucial factor that influences both; consortia coordination among 
members and market power. The costs of coordination increase with the number of members. 
Large groups may inhibit coordination failures such as “free riding” or “war of attrition” 
(Olson, 1971; Farrell and Simcoe, 2012). This may result in disputes and in cases of hardship 
lead to consortia termination. In comparison, we argued that the success of a standard is 
connected to a large group of companies that sponsor the standardized technology (David and 
Greenstein, 1990; Axelrod et al., 1995). Figure 8 compares five categories of consortia 
membership quantity and observes the survival curve over time. Again we adjusted the scale 
of survival rates in our y axis to make results visible. Large consortia with 200-300 and 300-
1000 members survive the longest over the years. Rather small consortia in comparison <50 
and 100-200 terminate in earlier periods. These results support the argument that consortia 
which gather a larger number of industry players are more successful and seem to operate 
significantly longer than small consortia. However, we have to keep in mind that narrow “one 
purpose consortia” with a planned termination are considerably smaller than others.  
 
Figure 8 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of consortia termination by membership size 
Consortia membership may influence termination not only by size but also by membership 
structures. We conduct another survival analysis and estimate if different membership 
arrangements influence survival rates. Figure 9 illustrates that for consortia with individual 
membership structures termination is more likely compared to others. Individual members 
participate not as a corporation but as individual persons. Members may still serve the interest 
of a group or company but participate in meetings and conferences individually. These 
consortia are often very technical and seek to solve specific problems which may not be 
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subject to corporate strategies. Again we assume these consortia to be limited in time and 
scope which would result in earlier termination.   
 
Figure 9 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of consortia termination by membership tiers 
In consortia where membership fees are revenue based or tiered, members which pay higher 
dues obtain more rights than others. As to the categorization of member levels in figure 3, 
leader firms may get full and early access to information, may participate in all meetings, may 
have certain veto or voting rights and may be part of the organizational management of the 
consortia (Updegrove, 2008). Tiered member levels thus ensure that strong market players 
can better influence standardization outcomes and bypass smaller entities which only 
participate as spectators or followers. Compared to flat membership and founder based 
membership, consortia with tiered structures more likely terminate over time (figure 9). 
However, we would expect that coordination failures would be solved by hieratical tiered 
structures. In comparison, in flat membership structures all members have the same rights, 
which may lead to discrepancies. Even though theoretical considerations are opposed to our 
finding, we could argue that tiered member structures are subject to a selection effect. 
Companies that pursue certain interests or seek to sponsor technologies that are not shared by 
other market participants may rather choose to join consortia where they can suppress others. 
Thus consortia with tiered structures would experience participation of companies that would 
generate more coordination problems compared to consortia with flat structures. 
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5. Conclusion and Discussion  
This paper intends to give a broad overview of standards consortia, its characteristics, 
organizational structures, policies and developments in the past ten years. Even though 
empirical analysis is rather descriptive, results already introduce coherences in terms of the 
consortia features and survival. Several characteristics differentiate the consortia phenomenon 
from other standard setting activities. By combining the assessed consortia information, 
relationships are revealed to deliver a more transparent picture of the consortia landscape. The 
stereotypical consortium could hence be described as having usually less than 100 members, 
following only one purpose of business, being hierarchical in its decision making structures 
and due to tiered membership fees, is often dominated by vendors and commercial entities. 
The stated IP policy is strongly connected to the produced technology. In contrast to formal 
standard bodies, consortia are very flexible and react to market developments. This either 
results in a formation as well as termination of businesses or mergers with other consortia. 
Involvement in consortia standard setting enables members to gain quick and flexible 
participation to influence the standardization process. Especially solvent vendors and 
commercial entities can use their strong membership positions to strategically direct a certain 
standard or specification.  
 This article further estimates survival rates to assess which consortia are successful 
and stable and how consortia features correlate with termination and continuity of business. In 
consideration of theoretical implications we show that especially structures of member 
coordination as well as focus and positioning on markets determines consortia survival over 
time. While termination may be planned for some consortia, others may close their business 
due to problems that can be connected to a consortium’s organizational approach. We show 
that larger consortia survive significantly longer compared to smaller consortia. However, 
when membership levels are tiered termination is more likely. Furthermore a narrow focus on 
certain technologies also leads to earlier termination, while the adopted IP policy seems to 
have no effect. 
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